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Comments on "On Conjoint Analysis and Quantal Choice Models" Two points touched upon in the Madansky paper (this issue) could use elaboration, and a third point needs to be introduced. The first point is sufficiently obvious to those who work on the theoretical aspects of measurement theory, but perhaps it is not so obvious to those with applied proclivities.
Sometimes, users of conjoint analysis criticize economics for assuming too much. As it turns out, the use of conjoint analysis presupposes the applicability of all the assumptions typical of economic preference theory and then some. Typically, economists assume no more than the existence of a complete, transitive preference relation over the "bundles" (to use Madansky's terminology). A random variable signifying some unobserved or perhaps unmeasured and impossible to control "influences" can be added to deal with the obvious problems of inconsistent subject choices.
Since conjoint analysis assumes the existence of a utility function The final point is with reference to the "preference reversal" phenomenon, which on our interpretation is inconsistent with the basic assumptions of both conjoint analysis and quantal choice. Many individuals will express a preference for one "bundle" in a pair but then exhibit a systematic tendency (see Lichtenstein and Slovic 1971; Grether and Plott 1979) to place a higher monetary value on the other "bundle." This type of "intransitivity" cannot be incorporated in either model. Thus even though conjoint analysis and quantal choice models may be very useful, they are both "wrong" in a basic theoretical sense. The interesting question then becomes not "Which is right?" but instead "Why do they work at all?"
